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Strategy is a political act, and yet that has received very little attention in IS strategy research. The purpose of this 
paper is to explore the mixes between politics, power and strategy using a case study of implementation of a Student 
Administration System. This takes Strategic Information Systems out of the realm of the purely socia-technical view 
of information systems and moves it into a dimension which deals with the real social interactions that occur within 
organisations as a result of the implementation of a strategy in the form of a Student Administration System. This 
case study shows the power struggles, primarily by two Senior Executives and the users of the information system. 
The discourse behind this project was initially to create uniformity across a system therefore enabling more than 30 
universities around Australia to move from a diversified system to a centralized system. It was through this 
resistance and through their positions that the two Senior Executives were able to create the discourse that framed 
many of the decisions and implementation of the system. There eventually became an acceptance that it was for the 
social good of the University that the Student Administration System was adopted across the University of Australia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategic InfOlmation Systems, the applications that contribute to an organisation at a strategic level, have been a key 
element of the discipline of information systems for a considerable time focusing on many elements of strategy 
including: IS strategic alignment (Chan and Huff, 1993), CIO's power, influence in IS strategic implementation 
(Enns and Huff, 1998) and CIO's influence behaviours (Enns, Huff and Higgens, 2000). However, strategy is a 
political act, and yet that has received velY little attention in IS strategy research. The purpose of this paper is to 
explore the mixes between politics, power and strategy using a case study of implementation of a Student 
Administration System. This is important because it takes strategic infOlmation systems out of the realm of the 
purely socio-technical view of information systems and moves it into a dimension which deals with the real social 
interactions that occur within organisations as a result of implementation of a strategy in the fOlm of a Student 
Administration System. 
Power, Politics and Strategic Information Systems 
Markus (1983), in her landmark paper, suggested that power, and more paIiicularly politics, playa fundamental and 
important role in information systems. In her paper Markus discusses the social aspects of infOlmation systems, 
particularly management infOlmation systems and provides us with a definition of power and politics in the IT 
context. Markus (1983) highlights the use of power and organisational politics in infOlmation systems. However, 
power and organisational politics are not applicable only to MIS implementation. Power and organisational politics 
is evident in information systems as a whole. More recent work by Romm and Pliskin (1999) and Ngwenyama and 
Lee (1997), also highlight the fact that politics and power do have some impact on information systems as a whole. 
In a recent paper, Peszynski and Corbitt (2003) argued that power and IS implementation are much more deeply 
intelTelated and contextualised within infOlmation systems. In a case study of an organisation implementing an 
information policy, Peszynski and Corbitt (2003) highlighted that power plays an extremely important role within the 
nature of the information system itself. The study described how the systems implementation policy worked for an 
organisation the specific committee and the subgroups associated with the implementation of the infOlwation 
systems. Complexity, messiness, inconsistencies, ambiguities and dilemmas were revealed within the multiple levels 
of systems implementation policy fOlwulation and re-formulation. What eventuated was a breakdown in the social 
relations between the participants in the information systems implementation. 
The power that was held by either the technical people or the management was challenged, constructed, re-
constructed, challenged again and eventually broken down. In this process a discourse became evident, not in 
isolation from infOlwation systems but in relation to it. The constraints from other policies such as strategic planning, 
government requirements and business practice became evident as they detracted attention and action away from the 
original purpose of the system itself. The big picture concerning implementation of business strategies subjugated 
assistance for the system implementation revealed that there was an expectation that subgroup members would just 
accept the bigger picture. However, these same members contested and publicly opposed that and subsequently the 
role of the strategy and the direction of the strategy itself were challenged. The system implementation was encoded 
in a number of complex ways. There was a struggle over directives and demands from the organisation and there 
were struggles over issues created by various and changing interpretations of the system throughout implementation. 
In essence there was plurality of interpretations of the system itself and this eventually impacted on the nature of and 
the importance of the strategy perfecting that implementation. 
So what is the relevance of strategic information systems in general? Strategy is the business focus. It aims to 
improve business performance or business efficiency and has occupied much of the business literature. The oft-
quoted Porter (1980) research and theory exemplifies this approach. Traditionally, in strategic infOlwation systems 
literature, strategy is seen as a rationalist concept and is about the production of business value. In essence, this is 
measurable business value. But strategy also serves other purposes and it is in some sense of this that one person or 
another uses a strategic information system or the strategy associated with an information system to centralise power 
or control. This begs a number of questions: How does politics and power impact on strategy and the development 
of a strategic information system? What are the outcomes or the effects ofthis process? Does the strategy itself have 
wider levels of value? Is there a personal value or personal motivation associated with the development and 
implementation of strategy? 
Previous strategic information systems research has not yet shown how politics and power are pervasive. Instead, 
they tend to show the business context in which strategy comes into play. We would contest this and argue that 
inevitably strategy is about power and that those who control the strategy and control the focus of the strategy 
actually enable power and will therefore influence the direction, shape and feel of the information system that is 
being implemented. So if power is an issue in strategic information systems how does it manifest itself and why? 
How does it further the manifestation of value other than' business value in the organisation? Why does it even 
manifest itself at all? Dealing with these theoretical issues; we would propose that it is best examined through a 
particular case study, discussed later in the paper. The objective of this paper is to answer the question, how do 
politics and power impact on strategy and the development of a strategic information system? 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
InfOlwation systems implementation takes place in the fluid setting of changing business. Implementation evolves 
more than just through a multistaged context (McLaughlin, 1987). Systems implementation is also an iterative 
process (Corbitt, 1997). McLaughlin (1987) claims that implementation success depends critically on two broad 
factors: local capacity and will. However, there are other factors that play an important role in ensuring success. 
Belief may also be nurtured from action. Even motivation or will is influenced by factors beyond the reach of 
implementation. Environmental stability, competing centres of authority, contending priorities or pressures and other 
aspects of the social-political milieu can influence implementation or willingness profoundly (Yin, 1994). 
Experience (McLaughlin, 1987) has proven that successful implementation generally requires a combination and 
balance of pressure and support. Pressure by itself may be insufficient when objectives contain their own 
implementation directions (Corbitt 1997). Pressure per se cannot effect those changes in attitudes, beliefs and routine 
practices typically assumed by reform policies. Ball (1990) argues that implementation results from the effects of 
influence, pressure, dogma, expediency, conflict compromise, intransigence, resistance, error, opposition and 
pragmatism. Communication of ideologies and arguments can be deliberately distorted by misinfOlwation to 
influence process and gain power (Forester, 1989). 
Implementation of business change is essentially political and non-rational (Self, 1981). They are influenced by 
pluralistic inequality associated with sectional interests, power and factions, often associated with specific 
stakeholders. In essence, implementation is divided and governed by the various stakeholders involved in the 
information systems processes. Lee, Corbitt and Kong (2000) suggest that the stakeholders who create commerce, 
either actively or passively construct and determine the nature of the commercial relationship, the business 
expression of implementation. In this process these pluralistic constructions of power and influence interact to 
impact on the path that implementation follows. This implementation process is influenced by, and influences human 
behaviour. Individuals can subvert and/or avoid attempts at regulation and unintended, unanticipated or 
unacknowledged consequences often result (Wallace, 1991). 
One approach to studies of implementation in information systems has focused on factor studies. The failure of 
information systems implementation has been linked to the absence of an IS champion or change agent, lack of 
management support (Ginzberg, 1981; Kydd, 1989; Corbitt 2000), strain on already restricted managerial time 
(Cragg and King, 1983), poor attitudes towards Information Systems (Corbitt, 1997), absence of education and 
training (Cragg and King, 1983), organizational problems (Markus, 1983), technical problems (Cragg and King, 
1983), and perceived gaps between expectations ofIS supporters and those expected to use the system (Kydd, 1989). 
Success in implementing intraorganisational information systems is attributable to a number of success factors 
(Grohowski and McGoff, 1990). These include organizational commitment, the existence of an executive sponsor 
within the organization (Raymond, 1985), the existence of an operating sponsor within the organization to provide 
quick feedback across the organization (Montazemi, 1988) and the existence of dedicated facilities within the 
organization. Cragg and King (1993) suggest that the implementation of IT in small businesses occurs most 
successfully where there is demonstrated relative advantage in terms of time saved, benefits accrued or discomfort 
decreased, and where competitive pressure could be addressed as IT was seen as an enabling technology that could 
make the firm flexible and profitable. Corbitt (2000) suggests that misguided conceptions that Electronic Commerce 
would deliver efficiencies, reduce costs, and improve service delivelY all at the same time, was a common mistake. 
Finally, the central importance of the role of management is supported by Pan, Shanks and Darke (1999) and 
Duchessi, Schaninger and Hobbs (1989). 
Daft and Lengel (1986), Kydd (1989) and Corbitt (1997) suggest that the interaction of equivocality and uncertainty 
in organisations can provide a useful means of understanding the important role of information in the adoption and 
implementation ofIT. Corbitt, Behrendorff and Brown-Parker (1997) suggest that demonstrated relative advantage in 
terms of time saved, benefits accrued or discomfOli decrease, and where competitive pressure could be addressed by 
IT, enable implementation. However, such factor studies are not reflective of the process which occurs through 
implementation. Implementation is neither driven entirely by factors of success or failure. Rather the implementation 
process in information systems is more reflective of the stakeholder relationship interactions and the impact of the 
context, both business, organizational, social and cultural, in which the implementation occurs. However, these 
conceptualisations ignore the political specter and the element of power in systems implementation. 
Markus (1983) argued that resistance in MIS implementation was either people-determined or system-determined. 
However, Markus also extended that argument and focused hers on a variant of integrationist theOlY, which 
suggested that there was a political aspect of and resistance towards IS and MIS implementation (Romm and Pliskin, 
1999; Myers and Young, 1997). Resistance is defined, according to Markus (1983, p. 432) as "a product of the 
interaction of system design features with the intra-organizational distribution of power, defined either objectively, in 
telms of horizontal or vertical power dimensions, or subjectively, in telms of symbolism." Markus (1983, p. 432) 
suggests, we believe, that potential users would resist information systems if "they cause a re-distribution of power 
that either conflicts with the organizational structure (objective definition) or with the interests of individuals who 
are likely to lose power as a result of the implementation (subjective definition)." 
More recently Peszynski and Corbitt (2003) argue that power is more diffuse and non-systematic than Markus (1983) 
had argued. Power within organisation in systems implemenJation results from and creates subjugation of one group 
to another. It is people influenced rather than people determined. Detelminism suggests that the power exists as some 
quantifiable whole and is ingrained and objective. Power in. reality is subjective. It is, and is becoming, rather than 
exists unmoved or unchanged. Power changes and is changed. It forms and reforms as the context in which it is 
created or displayed and is recontextualised by the actors operating within it. The sub group leaders in the 
organisation described gained their ability to resist from reputation gained and respect imbued in their legitimate 
power. Power is enacted by subterfuge, containment, disruption, challenge and radical action. Power is not static but 
dynamic and enforced through challenge rather than hierarchy or organisational structure, as the more 
interpretive/positivist paper of Markus in 1983. 
The Creation and TransfOl'mation of Power Relations 
When discussing the term power, we should not view it as a static, absolute term or concept. Instead, power should 
be viewed as a constantly changing, transforming concept, whereby people may have power at one point in time, and 
may have less, or no power at another point in time. This is similar to Foucault's (1978) view of power. For Foucault 
(1978), power is in the fonn of power relations, as opposed to power constantly held by one person for their entire 
existence. We need to understand that people do not have power implicitly. We should be focusing on the fact that 
power is a technique or action that individuals can engage in. According to Peszynski and Corbitt (2003) power is 
not possessed, it is exercised; essentially, 'Power is'. Power creates and is created by organisational attributes, social 
or cultural attributes and individual attributes. As a result, a power relation occurs where there is the potentiality for 
resistance. Power only arises between two individuals each of whom has the potential to influence the actions of the 
other and to present resistance to this influence (Foucault, 1978; Markus, 1983; Peszynski and Corbitt, 2003). 
There is an inherent political nature to power, and similarly to Foucault, Forester (1989, p. 45) sees power as political 
communication and concludes that "power works through the management of competence, or obfuscation; of t!ust, 
or false assurance; of consent, or manipulated agreement; and of knowledge or misrepresentation. Each of the three 
modes of power works in this way, either to thwart articulate democratic paIiicipation and encourage positivity, or to 
encourage articulate political action and the rationalisation of a democratic planning (policy) process." Forester 
(1989), following the argument of Foucault (1971; 1979; 1978), argues that these three modes of power derive their 
effectiveness from differential levels of knowledge existing in society. 
Foucault (1977) suggests that there is a link between power and knowledge. The work by Peszynski and Corbitt 
(2003) supports Foucault's (1977) work. That is, the knowledge held by the technical people and the knowledge held 
by management contributed to the information systems implementation. According to Foulcault (1977, p. 66) "there 
is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations." The knowledge held by each respective group 
constantly created and transfonned the power relations during the implementation process. 
The link created between knowledge and power is created via discourse (Foucault, 1978, p. 100). As a result, 
Foucault (1978, p. 100) suggests that "we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose 
tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. We must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted 
discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of 
discursive elements that can come into play in various st!·a\egies." According to Ball (1990, p. 17), discourses are, 
"about what can be said, and thought, but also about who caQ speak, when, where and with what authority." Foucault 
(1977, p. 49) further elaborates, stating that discourses are "practices that systematically fOlID the objects of which 
they speak ... Discourses are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them in the practice of 
doing so conceal their own invention." Discourses represent meaning and social relationships; they fOlID both 
subjectivity and power relations. Discourse enforces the link between knowledge and power. The work by Peszynski 
and Corbitt (2003) supports the use of discourse in the linking of power and knowledge in information system. It was 
through discourse in which the technical people and management challenged each other and implicitly, their power. 
Corbitt and Thanasankit (2002) extend Foucault's theory of power and argue that power is not limited to existence. It 
is also related to leadership and acceptance. Peszynski and Corbitt (2003) argue that power and hegemony change 
and are changed. They form and reform as the context in which it is created or displayed and is recontextualised by 
the actors operating within it. Hegemony is existential, created by previous experiences, and influenced by current 
experiences. Power relations and hegemony, due to their existential nature are dynamic, transfOlIDing and constantly 
changing. We create our ideologies, hegemony, discourses and power relations at the same time we are created by 
them - similar to Giddens' view of society under Structuration Theory (1984). 
A strategic infOlIDation system is implemented to either increase efficiency or improve business effectiveness and 
potentially increase profit. However, we would argue, based on the previous discussion, that the enabling of that 
strategic infOlIDation system, its implementation, its operational objectives and its outcomes are infOlIDed by more 
than business goals and strategy fOlIDulation. That discussion highlighted the importance of discourse. Who's 
agenda is being served by the strategy? Who is controlling the business agenda and detetIDining who can say or 
defend what? How is the hierarchy created and by who? In essence is the strategy fundamentally an expression of 
power by one or more people? 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This is a study that emerged from patiicipant observation of the implementation of a Student Administration System, 
supplemented by informal interviews and discussions with staff. In the process of participating in that process the 
authors discovered that such an important Student Administration System re-invigorated debate about the value of 
centralized strategic information systems across the university. What emerged was an accidental disclosure about the 
previous SIS - the student administration system. Many staff were willing to discuss the history of that system and 
its impact. The discourse it generated was at the centre of those disclosures. Staff, both general and academic, related 
stories about the history of domination and control with the implementation of the student administration system. It 
was that data and those discussions which formed the case study registered here. Each of the 25 participants 
participating in the discussions was asked about this project and their responses were collated and form the data set 
which fi'ames the analysis presented in this paper. The questioning was infOlmal at first but then became more formal 
as the discourse and problematic process emerged in discussions and from the participant observation. 
Data was recorded and transcribed from discussions. Notes were taken in the observation scenarios> Documents 
were collected and used as verification of conclusions reached. Interviews were recorded and were based on an 
informal set of questions (Kitwood, 1980) which were extended during the interviews (Spradley, 1979). Data was 
transcribed and then analyzed using thematic analysis of data based on the propositions of power and politics deIived 
fi'om the literature. Sorting of these findings was related to the thematic disclosure in the texts created and this 
formed the basis of the analysis. 
Meek (1987) argues that much research is accidental. Such accidents where actors disclosures become important as 
they not only contextualize process, they also recount power relations, and disclose discourse. In doing this they 
substantiate Foucault's (1977) argument about constituent knowledge and its embeddedness in history. This 
knowledge emerges as the foundation of power and, with discourse, enables consideration of a story and the 
deconstruction ofthe decision that supports, frames and creates, in this case, a Student Administration System. 
CASE STUDY 
A Strategic Information System that formed the basis for this case study was the implementation of a Student 
Administration System in a University in Australia. This University is large, having around 70,000 students over a 
number of campuses. The Student Administration System that was developed emerged, initially out of an attempt by 
the University system in Australia to collaborate and develop an information system, which would support student 
administration across all of the universities of Australia. The idea was that there would be a uniform system of 
classifying students with a standardized way of labeling courses and units. In essence the discourse behind that 
particular project was to create unifOlmity across a system so that interchange between universities, government data 
or government collection of data was able to happen. In effect there was a discourse of control centrally. It was 
moving the 30 plus universities of Australia fi'om a diversified system to a centralized system. 
In the University of Australia, senior management wanted to adopt this system immediately it was available. 
However, the national project collapsed. As the University of Australia was the lead player in this project, its Senior 
Executive, senior members of the University including the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellors and Pro 
Vice-Chancellors, decided that the investment had to be returned. A strategy was put in place to complete the 
development of the Student Administration System and implement it in the University. The reasons the 
developments continued were more about reputation and the desire to gain control of the process running inside the 
University of Australia, rather than real business value gain fi'om the strategy. 
Two Senior Executives at the University of Australia put a great deal of personal effort into the development of the 
Student Administration System. Their views were essentially in agreement based on the having the same knowledge 
and understanding of why such a system was important. There was a need to control and centralize student 
administration and as a consequence gain control of the process at all levels and across all areas of the university. 
Their decision was never spoken openly, but the impact was obvious. When questioned and challenged about the 
hidden agenda and motives running this project, there was a denial from the Senior Executive that evelyone had to 
comply with the new system. Instead, the justification given was for business efficiency and better process enabling 
cost savings. However, no cost savings ever emerged. What did emerge was a much larger Student Administration 
Department, which was needed to control the new system, and ultimately ensure that evelyone complied with the 
new system - reneging on their earlier denials of compliance. 
During the implementation process it was evident that a distinct conflict emerged between the Faculty and School 
administration staff and the central group. The Faculties and Schools had had a great deal of control over enrolments 
processes as separate entities. Each had their own institutionalized practices and each had their own simple student 
administration system governing their practice. The new Student Administrative System challenged this autonomy 
and there was considerable resistance to the centralized process from the Faculties. In fact, the Faculties refused to 
attend training sessions for the new product and even scoffed at its value to their business when it had developed in 
such contentious circumstances. The Student Adminish'ation System as a universities-wide process has dissolved in 
great conflict as one university after another withdrew. This led to staff at the University of Australia perceiving that 
the Student Administration System was flawed and untested in public, yet in interviews member noted that they 
really resented the imposition of it across the University and the demands it put on their time to move to new 
practices. There was also a strong sense that someone else was trying to conh'ol their work reflecting a change from 
one set of supervision reporting to another. 
In response to the lack of participation by appropriate staff in training, to a lack of cooperation about implementation 
and as a reaction to criticism of the new system, the Senior Executive of the University of Australia took a number of 
decisions. They fonnally made a directive to each of the Deans that the new Student Administration System was to 
be implemented immediately. In addition that central Student Administration Deparhnent changed the reporting lines 
of the administrative staff that operated that section of the work in each Faculty and School in the University. This 
new repOliing structure created new positions in each Faculty and each of these people were to work in the Faculty 
but report to the Head of Student Administration Department. This was peculiar move within the University. Despite 
significant protests and intervention by the Union, the process of restructure was implemented and the positions were 
advertised and filled. These new appointees knew that their task was to implement the new policy and thus the 
Student Administration System immediately. That is, they were employed to specifically ensure that compliance was 
met and the system was implemented. 
The implementation of the Student Administration System was set within a stated need to align the operations 
undertaken using the new Student Administration System with the University's goal of becoming better in the 
provision of services to students and as a means of improving communication with students. Students' evaluations 
over the past seven years would indicate that these goals were celiainly achieved. However what was not spoken in 
the process was the evident discourse that implementation of the Student Administration System was ultimately as 
much about strategic alignment as it as was about control and centralization of processes. The latter goals were never 
stated nor recognized officially but were agreed upon as being a driving force for the implementation by the Senior 
Executive of the University of Australia several years after the implementation. 
! 
The University of Australia has driven and implemented change to the Student Administration System over a seven 
year period implementing new versions as they have become available from its development group. During this 
process the central Student Administration Depmiment has grown from 30 staff to over 150. That Depmiment has 
increased its operational budget by almost 50 times. Their strength within the University of Australia is well 
recognized and the Student Administration System that was the cause of so much resistance has become a 
benchmark product commercially. The University staff who once resisted the new Student Administration System 
now embraces the new system and the new changes that have emerged in the system. The centralized reporting of 
staff responsible for the system has been maintained even when some of those positions have changed in name and 
the complexity of their responsibilities.' 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this paper was to explore the mixes between power, politics and strategy, using a case study of the 
implementation of a Student Administration System. We have presented a case study that investigates a Student 
Administration System which would support student administration across all the Universities of Australia. Early in 
the development of the Student Administration System, many Universities pulled out ofthis initiative and ultimately, 
it was the University of Australia that continued this development. This case study showed the power stmggles, 
primarily by two Senior Executives and the users of the infonnation system when this was abandoned as a strategy 
by other Universities. 
As the project progressed, the two Senior Executives took control of the implementation of the information system, 
at all levels and across all areas of the university. In the end, through lack of discussion with stakeholders, the power 
struggles were challenged and resistance was displayed by the systems users at the University of Australia. The 
employees refused to use the system despite the control exerted by the Senior Executives. Eventually a new 
organizational structure had to be put in place to ensure the strategy was met. New people with the right acceptance 
of discourse were employed to implement the new Student Administration System. 
The discourse behind this project was initially to create uniformity across a system therefore enabling more than 30 
universities around Australia to move from a diversified system to a centralized system. The intent was then to 
strengthen the internal control in each university over the powerful faculties who to this time had controlled student 
administrative processes pretty well. Within the University of Australia the intent was the same - cenh·alize and 
conh·ol. The public strategy of this university was efficiency and uniformity of process. The real discourse was about 
return on investment and conh·ol of administrative processes. This discourse was challenged many times by the users 
of the system. However, it was through this resistance that the Senior Executives took conh·ol of the system, 
establishing their own discourse. Hegemony was also necessaIY in the creation of the power relations, particularly 
for the Senior Executives. It was through their positions that the two Senior Executives were able to create the 
discourse that framed many of the decisions and implementation of the system. To facilitate this change they created 
a new structure and employed new personnel to speak the new discourse and exclude those that resisted. 
Resistance and conflict is fundamental to the process of creating power struggles and power relations. In the case of 
University of Australia, the constant iterations of the majority of staff not wanting to use the system, and the Senior 
Executives, exeliing their power, and hegemony as Senior Executives, forcing staff to use the system, enabled this 
process to take place. EvelY new systems implementation will go through fonus of power shuggles as described 
above. It could be suggested that this process is imperative in order to gain systems acceptance, as many users are 
intimidated by change. But it also indicates that when creating new systems, gaining the users' viewpoint on what 
may be helpful in their day-to-day processes could enable greater systems acceptance, therefore removing the 
maj ority of the power struggles. 
As highlighted earlier, Ball (1990) suggested that the implementation process endures influence, pressure, dogma, 
expediency, conflict compromise, intransigence, resistance, error, opposition and pragmatism. These were all 
experienced in the case study of the University of Australia. The pressure, opposition and resistance, congruent with 
the inflexibility and dogma, of both the senior executives and the staff led to the decisions that took place, and, 
ultimately, the success of the system. However success relied on implanting new staff who spoke the discourse. This 
process enabled the rest of the university community to reveal their hegemony and acceptance of the Student 
Administration System. In a way this parallels the hegemony in national cultures about the acceptance of government 
IT policy (Corbitt and Thanasankit 2002). The hegemony is clearly dominant in those nations where IT is 
strategically important to economic advancement, countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. The social good of 
adoption is considered of far more significance than that of the individual and acceptance of the hegemony is 
obvious. These societies accept that the dominance ofthe government will result in the growth and development that 
will foster success for them and for those that they support economically and socially. In a sense this case study of 
the implementation of a Student Administration System is similar. There eventually became an acceptance that it was 
for the social good of the university that the Student Administration System was adopted universally. Dominance by 
one discourse became accepted and cenh·alized control became practice. That alignment so important for strategy 
thus became evident in the Student Administration System and the University. The irony in this case study is that the 
staff refused to use the infonnation system initially, but having initially tried it, now sing its praise. They have in 
essence adopted the discourse, they have accepted the hegemony. 
Markus (1983) argues that politics plays a key role in organizational implementation and acceptance of an 
infonnation system. Peszynski and Corbitt (2003) argued in another context that complexity, messiness, 
inconsistencies, ambiguities and dilemmas are revealed within the multiple levels of systems implementation policy 
fonnulation and re-fonnulation. What eventuates in such circumstances is a breakdown in the social relations 
between the participants in the infonnation systems implementation. The power that is held by either the technical 
people or the management is challenged, constructed, re-constructed, challenged again and eventually broken down. 
In this process a discourse becomes evident, not in isolation from infOlmation systems but in relation to it. In the 
Student Administration System case used in this study, so,<ial relations were challenged and broken down through 
power transference and power relations. The messiness created by implementation affected the impact of control and 
challenged the power held within different stakeholder groups. In this Student Administration System the held power 
was contested by refelTed power in the organizational context and created a system fostered and owned by a more 
c' 
" 
centralized organizational unit. Power was made to shift. The nature of the power of control of the information 
system was recontextualised from a distributed to a centralized system, mainly through the complexities created, the 
inconsistencies in practice and the dilemmas of ownership challenging past practice. Each disabled existing power 
relations and created new ones. Power then became a driver for change and created new sets of power relations, 
focused in a different social context within the host organization. 
REFERENCES 
Ball, S. (1990). Politics and Policy Making in Education, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Chan, Y. E. and S. L. Huff (1993). "Investigating information systems strategic alignment." Proceedings of the 
Fourteenth International Conference on Information Systems, Orlando, Florida, pp. 345-363. 
Corbitt, B. 1. (1997). "Uncertainty and Equivocality in the Adoption of Electronic Commerce by SMEs' in 
Australia," Working Paper, Department ofInformation Systems, University of Melbourne. 
Corbitt, B. 1. (2000). "Developing Intraorganizational e-commerce strategy: an ethnographic study," Journal of 
Information Technology, 15, pp. 119-130 
Corbitt B. Behrendorff, G., and Brown-Parker, 1. (1997). "SMEs and Electronic Commerce," Management (April), 
pp. 12-13. 
Corbitt, B. and Thanasankit, T. (2002). "Acceptance and Leadership-Hegemonies of E-Commerce Policy 
Perspectives," Prometheus, 20(1), pp. 39-57. 
Cragg, P., and King, M. (1983). "Small-firm Computing: Motivators and Inhibitors," MIS Quarterly, 17(1), pp. 47-
60. 
Daft, R. L., and Lengel, R. H. (1986). "Organizational Information Requirements, Media Richness and Structural 
Design," Management Science, 32(5), pp. 554-572. 
Duchessi, P., Schaninger, c., and Hobbs, D. (1989). "Implementing a Manufacturing Planning and Control 
Information System," California Management Review, pp. 75-90. 
Enns, H., and Huff, S. (1998). "CIOs' Power, Influence, and IS Strategy Implementation," Proceedings of the fifth 
Americas Conference on Information Systems, Baltimore, pp. 511-513. 
Enns, H., Huff, S., and Higgins, C. (2000). "CIO lateral influence behaviors: gaining peers' commitment to strategic 
information systems," Proceeding of the twenty-first International Conference on Information Systems, Brisbane, pp. 
457-460. 
Forester, 1. (1989). Planning in the Face of Power, Californi~, University of California Press. 
Foucault, M. (1971). The Order of Discourse. Paris: Gallima~d. 
Foucault, M. (1977). The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Tavistock. 
Foucault, M. (1978). The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction (First American Edition ed. Vol. 1). New 
York: Pantheon Books. 
Foucault, M. (1979). Powel~ Truth, Strategy. Sydney: Feral Publications. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society - Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Ginzberg, M. 1. (1981). "Early Diagnosis of MIS Implementation Failure: Promising Results and Unanswered 
Questions," Management Science, 27(4), pp. 459-477. 
Grohowski, R., McGoff, C., Vogel, D. R., Martz Jr., B. M., and Nunamaker Jr., 1. F. (1990), "Implementing 
Electronic Meeting Systems at IBM: Lessons Learned and Success Factors," MIS Quarterly, 14(4), pp. 369-383. 
Kittwood, T. (1980) Disclosure to a Stranger, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, UK. 
Kydd, C. T. (1989). "Understanding the Infonnation Content in MIS Management too," MIS Quarterly, 13(3), pp. 
277-381. 
Lee, C. Y., Corbitt, B. 1., and Kong, W. (2000) "Stakeholder Relationships and Electronic Commerce 
Differentiation: A Preliminary Investigation in Singapore and Australia," Proceedings of the Pacific Asia Conference 
on Information Systems, Hong Kong, CD-ROM. 
Ngwenyama, O. K., & Lee, A. S. (1997). Communication tichness in electronic mail: Ctitical social theory and the 
contextuality of meaning. MIS Quarterly, 21(2), pp. 145-167. 
Markus, M. L. (1983). "Power, Politics and MIS Implementation," Communications of the ACM, 26, pp. 430-444. 
McLaughlin, M. W. (1987). "Learning from Expelience: Lessons from Policy Implementation," Educational 
Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 9(2), pp. 171 - 178. 
Meek, V. L. (1987). "The Coalface Revisited" pp. 189-218 in Ways and Means of Research in Educational 
Administration, MacPherson, R. 1. S. (Ed.), University of New England Teaching Monograph, University of New 
England, Annidale, Australia. 
Montazemi, A. R. (1988). "Factors Affecting Information Satisfaction in the Context of the Small Business 
Environment," MIS Quarterly, 12(2), pp. 239-256. 
Myers, M. D., and Young, L. W. (1997). Hidden agendas, power and managerial assumptions in information systems 
development - An ethnographic study. Information, Technology, and People, 10(3), pp. 224-240. 
Parr, A. N., Shanks, G., and Darke, P. (1999). "Identification of Necessary Factors for Successful Implementation of 
ERP Systems," New Information Technologies in Organizational Processes: Field Studies and Theoretical 
Reflections on the Future of Work, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht/London. 
Peszynski, K. 1. and Corbitt, B. (2003). "Putting the Power in Power, Politics, and MIS Implementation: A 
reworking of Markus (1983) 20 years on," Proceedings of the 14th Australian Conference on Information Systems, 
Perth, CD-ROM. 
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. Free Press: New 
York. 
Raymond, L. (1985). "Organizational Characteristics and MIS Success in the Context of Small Business," MIS 
Quarterly, 9(1), pp. 37-52. 
Romm, C. T., and Pliskin, N. (1999). The Office Tyrant - S,ocial Control Through E-mail. Information, Technology, 
and People, 12(1), pp. 27-43. 
Self, P. (1981). "Planning: Rational or Political?" in Policy Analysis and Policy Innovation: Patterns, Problems and 
Potentials, Baehr, P. R. and Wittrock, B. (Eds.) (1981), Sage Publications, London, pp. 221-236. 
Spradley, j. (1979) The Ethnographic Interview, Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, New York, USA. 
Wallace, M. (1991). "Contradictmy Interests in Policy Implementation: The Case of LEA Development Plans for 
Schools," Journal of Education Policy, 6(4), pp. 385-399. 
Yin, R. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods. California: Sage Publications. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors wish to thank the reviewers for their feedback and assistance in improving the paper. 
COPYRIGHT 
Peszynski, K. 1., Corbitt, B. and Saundage, D. © 2004. The authors assign to ACIS and educational and non-profit 
institutions a non-exclusive licence to use this document for personal use and in courses of instlUction provided that 
the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. The authors also grant a non-exclusive licence to 
ACIS to publish this document in full in the Conference Papers and Proceedings. Those documents may be published 
on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed fmID, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. Any other usage is 
prohibited without the express pelIDission of the authors. 
